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Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Concern*
I. Introduction
In a recent National Hockey League (NHL) game between the Boston
Bruins and the New York Rangers, a fight broke out among the rival players.
Without provocation, a Ranger fan reached over the protective glass and
punched a Bruin player. Within a matter of seconds, several Bruin players
ascended into the stands to avenge their teammate. With fists and hockey sticks
flying, the confrontation between players and spectators continued for more
than fifteen minutes.1
During another NHL game, Henry Boucha, of the Minnesota North
Stars, and Dave Forbes, of the Boston Bruins, had been sent to the penalty box
for fighting. As Boucha skated towards his team's bench at the expiration of the
penalties, he was attacked by Forbes who struck him in the face with the butt
end of his hockey stick and pummeled him with his fists after he had dropped to
the ice.2 Remedial surgery was required to relieve Boucha's double vision in
what NHL President Clarence Campbell termed "one of the most vicious in-
cidents that he had been called to deal with. ' 3
In a National Basketball Association (NBA) game between the Houston
Rockets and the Los Angeles Lakers, the Rockets' Rudy Tomjanovich rushed
to break up a fight between one of his teammates and the Lakers' Kermit
Washington. As Tomjanovich approached the pair, Washington whirled and
hit him with a punch which resulted in fractures of the face and skull, a broken
nose, a separated upper jaw, a cerebral concussion and severe lacerations
around the mouth. In effect, the bone structure of his face was knocked loose
from his skull. 4
While the Steelers' Terry Bradshaw was completing a pass to Franco Har-
ris in a National Football League (NFL) game between the Pittsburgh Steelers
and the Oakland Raiders, some fifteen yards away the Raiders' George Atkin-
son rushed up behind an unsuspecting Lynn Swann and hit him with his
forearm at the base of the helmet. Swann collapsed, suffering a concussion and
putting him out of action for the next two games. 5
These incidents have a common element, unrestrained and needless
violence in the context of professional athletic competition. Such violence in
professional sports may have an effect on the larger society. "Violence of any
kind, whether physical violence, a violent disregard for the rules, or just a
momentary violent human reaction to an unexpected movement, is a strong
creator of lasting images." 6 Sadly enough, the examples given here represent a
* The author dedicates this Note to the Rev. Edmund P. Joyce, C.S.C., whose twenty-eight years of
guidance to the athletic programs at this institution have assured that sportsmanship will always be the rule
and never the exception at Notre Dame. C.J.R., June 1, 1980.
1 See Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 7, 1980, at 9.
2 See Mulvoy, Hockey Is Courting Disaster, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 27, 1975, at 16.
3 Id.
4 See Kirkpatrick, Shattered and Shaken, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 2, 1978, at 46.
5 See Johnson, A Walk on the Sordid Side, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1977, at 12.
6 Benedict, Pro Basketball... Is It a Violent Sport? PETERSON'S PRO BASKETBALL, 1979-80, at 4.
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mere fraction of the violent incidents in sports. This violence creates a sordid
image which reflects on sports, and on the society as well:
The game [football] became contaminated, but the process was so gradual and
so insidious that few took notice. From the kiddie leagues to the major colleges
and professional leagues, the sport's public image grew more robust even as it
decayed within. The injury rate mounted, sportmanship declined. Vicious
acts became commonplace. 7
Who controls violence in sports? Traditionally, sports violence has been
controlled internally by means of game penalties, fines, and suspensions. Pro-
ponents of internal control argue that the sport's individual administrators 8
know better than anyone what conduct is reasonable and what risks the players
do, in fact, assume. It has been suggested that the internal administrator's
close contact with the development of the game and its players better enable
him to regulate the level of violence. 9
In view of the incidents mentioned above and others like them, it is clear
that internal controls have failed to deal effectively with sports violence. These
failures have brought to light the increasing need for societal control over the
violence which occurs on the playing field. Violence in sports is a matter of
grave societal concern. Admittedly, internal administration of such controls
may be preferable. Given the past failures of internal control, however, society
must not hesitate to intervene and deter violent behavior before its influence
adversely affects other aspects of our lives. The District Court in Hackbart v.
Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.'0 noted "that the question of community interest in
limiting the violence in professional football concerns not only the protection of
the participants, but also the effects of such violence on those who observe
it." I I The Hackbart court grimly recognized that the "the NFL has substituted
the morality of the battlefield for that of the playing field, and the restraints of
civilization have been left on the sidelines."1 2 Clearly, if society is to function
harmoniously, the "restraints of civilization" must be brought to bear on peo-
ple in all professions, especially those in professional sports.
This Note will consider the available means by which society can control
violence in team contact sports. More specifically, it will focus on the potential
civil and criminal liability of players, coaches, management and game officials
for violent behavior in sports.13 This potential liability will be examined with
respect to its value in permitting society to regain control over the conduct of
those engaged in such sports.
7 Underwood, An Unfolding Tragedy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 14, 1978, at 70.
8 The terms sports administrators, sports authorities, league officials and league management are used
synonymously to refer to the governing bodies of a partigular sport (e.g., NFL, NHL, NBA), or to bodies
that govern sports in general (e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)).
9 See Note, Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. Rav. 771, 784.
10 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), reo'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
11 Id. at 357.
12 Id. at 358.
13 This Note will not consider contact sports played between individuals, such as boxing. Also, this will
not consider legislative action as a possible source of societal regulation. Although it is a viable control, it
will not be discussed because of the wide and varied course possible legislative controls might take. The
author believes, however, that due to its general and compromising nature, legislative action is inferior to
the specfic case remedies afforded by a court of law. The fact specific nature of most acts of sports violence
makesfact specific judicial resolution a more sensible means of control.
NOTES




A defendant can be held liable for battery if he has done some positive and
affirmative act with the intention of causing an unpermitted contact with the
plaintiff and such contact results. 14 If, with the same intent, the plaintiff is put
in "imminent apprehension" of a battery which does not occur, the defendant
can still be liable for an assault.' 5 Based upon an allegation of either assault or
battery, a basketball player who was punched by an opponent, 16 a batter in a
baseball game who was struck by the opposing team's catcher, 17 and a hockey
player who had been intentionally hit in the face with a hockey stick by an op-
ponent,18 were able to recover from their assailants.
The main issue in litigation dealing with the question of assault or battery
is not whether an intentional tort has been committed but is, rather, whether
the plaintiffs recovery is barred by the equitable maxim volenti non fit
injuria-"he who consents cannot receive an injury."1 9 "One who enters into a
sport, game or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts, consistent
with the understood rules of the game." 20 The player's consent, either express
or implied, goes to the defendant's conduct, rather than to its consequences.
However, the defendant's privilege is limited to the conduct to which the plain-
tiff consents, or at least to acts of a substantially similar nature. 21 "If the defen-
dant goes beyond the consent given, and does a substantially different act, he is
liable.' '22
Undoubtedly, a hockey player consents to an aggressive "check" into the
boards. It is, and should be, "part of the game." It is similarly evident that the
same hockey player does not consent to being intentionally struck in the face
with the hockey stick of an irate opponent. This is not and never should be part
of the conduct to which any athlete is deemed to consent.
2. Negligence
The elements of a negligence cause of action are:
1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform
to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks;
2) A failure on his part to conform to the standard required;
14 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 9 9, at 34-37 (4th ed. 1971).
15 See id. § 10, at 37-41.
16 Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 (1955).
17 Averill v. Luttrell, 4 Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957).
18 Agar v. Canning, [1965] 54 W.W.R. 302, affd, [1966] 55 W.W.R. 384.
19 See generally 4 AM. JUR. 2d Amusements and Exhibitions § 86 (1962).
20 W. PROSSER, supra note 14 § 18, at 102.
21 Id. at 103.
22 Id. at 104.
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3) A reasonably close connection between the conduct and the resulting in-
jury; and
4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of others. 23
The otherwise tortious conduct of the defendant will not be deemed
negligent when the plaintiff is found to have "assumed the risk."
[It may be stated as a general rule that voluntary, suijuris participants in a
lawful sporting activity assume, as a matter of law, all of the ordinary and in-
herent risks in the sport, so long as the activity is played in good faith and the
injury is not the result of an intentional or willful act. 24
Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, football players have been found to
assume the risks inherent in being tackled; 25 participants in a family softball
game were held to assume the risk that during the course of the game someone
might "slide" into a base; 26 and the "on-deck" batter in a baseball game was
found to have assumed the risk of being struck by a bat which slipped from the
batter's sweaty hands.
27
[T]he general rule of assumption of risk will be inapplicable where the injured
participant can establish that the injuries were either the result of other than
good faith competition or the product of risks which are not ordinary or in-
herent in the sport in question. An unreasonable risk of injury may be created
by the lack of skill or improper conduct of other participants or by the manner
in which a particular activity is conducted. Such risks would not be assumed
by the participant to the extent that they did not constitute the ordinary and
inherent risks of the sport. 28
In Bourque v. Duplechin29 a second baseman in a softball game was held not
to assume the risk that a base runner would go five feet out of the base path to
"break up" an attempted double play. 30 The court in Bourque realized that a
participant must be held to assume those risks incidental to the game which are
obvious and foreseeable.3 1 The court reasoned, however, "[a] participant does
not assume the risk of injury from fellow players acting in an unexpected or
unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of concern for others
participating.' '32
Few sports cases can be found which have allowed the plaintiff to recover
on a showing of mere negligence. This is due largely to the fear that imposition
of liability in such cases would discourage participation in sports-related ac-
tivities. 33 In Bourque, one of the cases in which recovery has been granted, the
court spoke of a "reckless lack of concern," a standard which appears to re-
23 Id. S 30, at 143.
24 J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.02, at 936 (1979).
25 Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962).
26 Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966).
27 Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 1961).
28 J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 24, at 942.
29 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 210 (La. 1976).
30 Id. at 42.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Note, Injuries Resulting from Nonintentional Acts in Organized Contact Sports: The Theories of Recovery
Available to the Injured Athlete, 12 IND. L. REv. 687, 694, (1979).
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quire more than mere negligence. Because application of a strict negligence
standard to team contact sports would not only deter sports violence but par-
ticipation in sports as well, requiring a showing of recklessness is the better ap-
proach.
3. The Restatement Position
Comment b of section 50 of the Restatement of Torts states:
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily con-
tacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages. Par-
ticipating in such a game does not manifest consent to contacts which are pro-
hibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules or usages are designed to
protect the participants and not merely to secure the better playing of the
game as a test of skill. This is true although the player knows that those with or
against whom he is playing are habitual violators of such rules. 34
The most contentious issue in sports violence litigation centers on the
degree to which a player consents to, or assumes the risk of, violent behavior
from his competitors. The Restatement (Second) provides a workable standard by
recognizing that a player accepts conduct which is permitted by the rules of the
game but does not consent to conduct which violates a safety rule. The delinea-
tion between safety rules and rules the purpose of which is "merely to secure
the better playing of the game as a test of skill" is a justifiable one. Prohibiting
football players from "spearing" 3 5 one another, for example, serves only to
deter violence and eliminate injuries. Liability based on such a violent tactic as
"spearing" would neither inhibit the vigorous participation of athletes nor
diminish the attraction of the game to the spectators. On the other hand, im-
posing tort liability on an offensive lineman who goes "offside ' 36 would be
disastrous. Such imposition would reduce every physical movement made by a
player to a potential cause of action. This distinction, therefore, is solidly
rooted in commonsense. For this reason, courts have increasingly seen fit to
adopt its rationale. 37
Comment b does not cofndition the applicability of its provisions on the
status, professional or amateur, of the player. Although it has been argued by
some38 that professional athletes should be held to assume a greater risk and,
therefore, be held to a lower standard of care, applying the restraint of the
Restatement (Second) to amateurs and professionals alike is more practical and
better serves the overall purpose of deterring sports violence. Whether conduct
is reasonable should be judged by the nature of the game, its rules and other at-
tending circumstances, such as the level of experience and expertise of the
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 50, Comment b (1965).
35 The NCAA football rules define spearing as "the deliberate use of the helmet in an attempt to punish
an opponent." 1979 NCAA Football Rule 2, § 24, art. 1.
36 The NCAA football rules define offside as "the position of a player, . . . any part of whose person is
beyond his scrimmage line or his restraining line when the ball is put in play." 1979 NCAA Football Rule 2,
S 18, art. 1.
37 See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516
(10th Cir. 1979); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975). See also text accompany-
ing notes 39-53 infra.
38 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979); Note, supra note 33, at 710.
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players. Whether an athlete is paid for services is relevant only as indicative of
the level of his experience and expertise. Also, such a distinction would result
in an illogical classification. For instance, the standard expected of twenty-one-
year-old college football players would be the same as ten-year-old "pee-wee"
league players because both are "amateurs." After receiving their first NFL
paychecks one year later, the ex-collegiate players will be held to a lower stan-
dard of care than their former teammates who are still in college. This distinc-
tion is illogical because violence is similarly dangerous in both professional and
amateur athletics. Moreover, the highly visible conduct of professional
athletes, may, in effect, set the standard of conduct for amateurs who may
repeat what they see on television. To permit the paid athlete to demonstrate a
lower standard of care is, therefore, counter-productive to any effort to reduce
the level of violence in sports. The Restatement (Second) approach avoids this in-
consistency.
4. Impact of Nabozny, Hackbart, and Tomjanovich
Three recent cases have suggested the standard which courts will apply in
dealing with tort claims arising out of team contact sports. These cases also
reveal a willingness on the part of the courts to deal with these wrongs despite
the fact that they took place within the confines of athletic competition.
In Nabozny v. BarnhilP9 the plaintiff, a goalkeeper in a soccer match,
received permanent skull and brain damage when kicked by the defendant, a
player on the opposing team. The incident took place inside the penalty area
where any contact with the goaltender, regardless of intent, is a violation of the
rules. The court prefaced its opinion by noting that the law should avoid plac-
ing unreasonable burdens on active participation in athletics. However' the
court stated, "[W]e also believe that organized athletic competition does not
exist in a vacuum. Rather, some of the restraints of civilization must accom-
pany every athlete onto the playing field. One of the educational benefits of
organized athletic competition to our youth is the development of discipline
and self-control.' '40 The court held that in competitive sports in which 1) the
competitors are trained and coached by knowledgeable personnel; 2) a
recognized set of rules governs the conduct of the competition; and 3) safety
rules are contained therein which are designed primarily to protect players
from serious injury; the standard of care owed by a player to his fellow com-
petitors is "to refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety rule. ' 41 According
to the court, liability in tort will result when a player's "conduct is such that it
is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other
player so as to cause injury to that player. "42 The court remanded the case for
a jury determination of the issues of defendant's negligence and plaintiffs con-
tributory negligence.
The Nabozny court's emphasis on safety rules was derived from the distinc-
tion drawn by Comment b of section 50 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 43 As
39 31 111. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
40 Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260.
41 Id.
42 Id. 334 N.E.2d at 261.
43 See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
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previously mentioned, it is believed that this distinction serves as a useful tool
for measuring the extent of a participant's consent. The court also rejected the
mere negligence standard and opted for the "reckless disregard" standard
mentioned above. This standard requires a showing of more than mere
negligence but does not require evidence of a specific intent to injure.
Significantly, the Nabozny court noted that it did not want to impede
athletic participation but emphasized that every athlete must come to the play-
ing field subject to some of the "restraints of civilization.'14 4 The court proper-
ly recognized that sports serves society, not vice versa. Many valuable lessons
are learned in athletics, among them leadership, pride, hard work, coopera-
tion, and sportsmanship. Society should not, and cannot, tolerate the erosion
of these benefits by allowing unrestrained violence, which benefits no one and
injures many.
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 45 the plaintiff, a free safety for the
Denver Broncos, received a broken neck as a result of an altercation with the
defendant, Charles "Booby" Clark, a Bengal running back. Following an in-
terception by one of his teammates, Hackbart fell to the ground after attempt-
ing to block Clark. Hackbart turned and with one knee extended watched the
play continue upfield. While Hackbart knelt, Clark stepped forward and struck
a blow with his right forearm to the back of Hackbart's head with sufficient
force to cause both players to fall to the ground. No comment was made and
the players returned to their sidelines. Because no official had witnessed the in-
cident no penalty flag was thrown and the injury was not discovered until
later. 46
Booby Clark's conduct clearly violated article 1, item 1, subsection C of
the NFL rules which provides: "All players are prohibited from striking on the
head, face, or neck with the heel, back or side of the hand, wrist, elbow,
forearm or clasped hands." '4 7 The district court in Hackbart found that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of Clark's act. 4s Further, the district court noted
the violence in professional football, but ruled as a matter of policy that con-
flicts occurring on a professional football field were not properly resolved in the
courts.
49
On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed:
"Contrary to the position of the [district] court, . . . there are no principles of
law which allow a court to rule out certain tortious conduct by reason of
general roughness of the game or difficulty of administering it. "50 Further, the
court noted:
The general customs of football do not approve the intentional punching or
striking of others .... Punching or hitting with the arms is prohibited. Un-
doubtedly these restraints are intended to establish reasonable boundaries so
that one football player cannot intentionally inflict a serious injury on another.
Therefore the notion is not correct that all reason has been abandoned,
44 31 111. App. 3d at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260.
45 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo., 1977), rev.d, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
46 Id.
47 601 F.2d at 521.
48 435 F. Supp. at 356.
49 Id. at 357.
50 601 F.2d at 520.
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whereby the only possible remedy for the person who has been the victim of an
unlawful blow is retaliation.5'
The Tenth Circuit went on to find that Clark had demonstrated "reckless
misconduct" in his disregard of the duty he owed to his fellow players.
5 2
Clark's conduct, according to the Court, was more than mere inadvertence
even though he lacked the specific intent to injure required for an action for
assault or battery.5 3 Hackbart is consistent with the growing line of authority,
first seen in Nabozny, which prohibits athletes from acting in reckless or willful
disregard of rules designed to promote the safety of the players. The Tenth Cir-
cuit transmitted a sobering message to the sports establishment-if they cannot
keep their own house clean, the courts will not hesitate to do it for them.
In Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc.,5 4 the jury awarded Rudy Tom-
janovich $3,246,376.00 ($1,746,376.00 in actual damages and $1,500,000.00
in punitive damages). The action stemmed from the "punch heard 'round the
world." On December 9, 1977, Tomjanovich, of the Houston Rockets, was
rushing to break up a fight between his teammate Kevin Kunnert and Kermit
Washington, of the Los Angeles Lakers, when the latter turned and landed
what Laker assistant coach Jack McCloskey called "the hardest punch in the
history of mankind.'"5 Tomjanovich suffered multiple fractures of the face and
skull, severe lacerations around the mouth and a cerebral concussion.5 6 The
jury found that Washington had committed a battery and had acted with
"reckless disregard for the safety of others.' 's7
The Tomjanovich case is important for two reasons. First, since the judg-
ment came from a jury, the enormous damage award evidences the degree of
societal concern with violence in sports. These jurors were, arguably, represen-
tative of the people who watch sports in person and on television, who have
participated in their youth and whose children now participate. Their verdict is
an indication of a societal consciousness which will no longer tolerate the type
of extreme violence exhibited in the Tomjanovich-Washington incident.
Secondly, this case was unique since California Sports, Inc., owner of the
Lakers and Washington's employer, was the defendant in the suit rather than
the player himself. Its eventual liability was based on the theory that it was
negligent in retaining Washington after it became aware that he had a tenden-
cy for violence while playing basketball. 58
It is arguable that the large jury award in Tomjanovich was the result of jury
willingness to deal severely with corporations. Tomjanovich, undoubtedly,
found the "deepest pocket" to sue and probably would have recovered less
against Washington than he did against California Sports, Inc. Three million
dollars, taken in the context of sports violence liability is, nonetheless, a very
severe sanction whoever the defendant may be.
51 Id. at 521.
52 Id. at 524.
53 Id.
54 Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. 78-243 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1979).
55 Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 46.
56 Id.
57 Woolf, Courts Coming Down Hard on Excessively Violent Players, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 7, 1980, at 20.
58 The plaintiff introduced evidence showing that Washington had nine fights in four years. See SPORTS
L. REP., Aug. 1979, at 1.
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Holding the owner liable presents the most effective deterrent to sports
violence. If damage awards of this size are the price of employing the so-called
"enforcers," owners may begin to find it more advantageous to return to
employing players who specialize in the "skills of the game" rather than in the
"skills of the barroom."
Reflecting on the Hackbart and Tomjanovich decisions, Bob Woolf, a
respected attorney who practices in the area of sports law, noted: "The cases
indicate a more reasonable trend of thinking toward malicious actions which
increase only the danger, and not the interest level, in sports. The strong posi-
tions taken by the two different courts should, hopefully, serve as an effective
deterrent on intentional violence in sport." 59
B. Criminal Sanctions
Assault and battery is a wrong not only against another human being but
against society as well. Hockey players Wayne Maki, Ted Green, and Dave
Forbes have each faced criminal prosecution for acts of violence done in the
heat of athletic competition. 60 Theoretically, the team executives should be at-
tempting to quell violence in their sport. Very often, however, the opposite
seems to be the case. In early 1975 Dave Forbes, of the Boston Bruins, was in-
dicted by a grand jury for his vicious attack on the Minnesota North Stars'
Henry Boucha. 61 Rather than expressing concern over the conduct of his
employee, Harry Sinden, managing director of the Bruins, said: "If Forbes is
convicted of anything, we'd have to think about letting Bobby Orr, Phil
Esposito and all our other players ever skate in Minnesota again.' '62 The lack
of seriousness with which Sinden and other sports administrators view these
acts underscores the need for societal control. Putting an athlete on trial for
assault and battery is an undesirable alternative but one that must be exercised
if internal controls and civil liability fail as effective deterrents.
The elements of the crime of battery are: 1) an act by the defendant; 2) an
intent to injure; and 3) some harmful result to the victim. 6 3 "The problem fac-
ing prosecutors in changing athletes with criminal code violations is the nature
of many sporting events, wherein players consent to being assaulted as part of
the game itself." 64 Consent in the criminal context is similar to, and represents
many of the same problems, which attend the issue of consent in the tort con-
text. Application of the consent defense under the criminal law requires two
steps. First, society must decide, as a matter of public policy, whether consent
is to be a defense to the act in question. There are some acts, particularly
egregious in nature, to which society will not permit a person to consent.
Secondly, if the defense is allowed, the court must determine its legal effec-
tiveness under the facts of the case. 65
59 Woolf, supra note 57.
60 State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4thJud. Dist., judgment of mistrial entered, Aug. 12,
1975); Regina v. Green, [1970] 16 D.L.R.3d 137; Regina v. Maki, [1970] 14 D.L.R.3d 164.
61 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
62 Mulvoy, supra note 2, at 16.
63 See generally W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 5 81 (1972).
64 Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425, 433 (1977).
65 Note, The Consent Defense: Sports, Violence and the Criminal Law, 13 AMER. CRIM. L. REv. 235, 238
(1975).
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Presuming the availability of consent as a defense to batteries which are
"part of the game, "no athlete should be presumed to accept malicious, un-
provoked, or overly violent attack. "66 The opinions in Regina v. Green67 and
Regina v. Maki 8 reiterate expressly or by implication the established principle
that there is a limit on the magnitude and the dangerousness of a blow to which
another is permitted to consent. 69 "[I]t is up to the jury, by determining the ex-
tent of any such consent, to define the scope of the conduct which will be legally
tolerated by society in such athletic contests." '70
If a hockey fan forcefully shoves another in the arena parking lot, he can
be prosecuted for assault and battery. Why, then, should a hockey player who
maims an opponent with his stick inside the arena be applauded as being "ag-
gressive"? Prosecutors would have little difficulty proving the elements of
assault and battery in most cases of sports violence. "[T] he athlete's tacit im-
munity, therefore, must be largely attributed to nonlegal factors affecting the
discretionary decision not to prosecute.'' 71 These nonlegal factors center
around the traditional notion that if any discipline is needed in sports the sports
administrators are best equipped to apply it by internal means. Indeed, as
evidenced by the district court in Hackbart, the legal system has sometimes
acted as if sports are outside the realm of judicial control. 72 Judicial restaint in
dealing with sports violence cases is a valid policy only when internal controls
are successful. When internal restraints falter, however, every legal recourse
must be available to control that which society will not tolerate. "The difficult
question is when is sports misconduct serious enough to make the arguments
for legal control more persuasive than those for internal control? ' 73 Due to the
special characteristics of different sports at various levels of competition, this
question, by necessity, must be answered on a case-by-case basis.
III. Liability of Nonplayers
Civil and criminal liability have been discussed as they pertain to the duty
owed by one player to another. The possibility of imposing similar liability on
coaches, 74 management and game officials provides alternative methods of
deterring sports violence.
The district court in Hackbart found that coaches in professional football
"make studied and deliberate efforts to build the emotional levels of their
players to what some call a 'controllable rage.' -75 Testifying before the same
court, John Ralston, coach of the 1973 Denver Broncos, stated that:
66 Id. at 241.
67 [1970] 16 D.L.R.3d 137.
68 [1970] 14 D.L.R.3d 164.
69 Note, supra note 65, at 241.
70 Note, Criminal Law. Consent as a Defense to Criminal Battery-The Problem of Ahletic Contests 28 Oxs. L.
REv. 840, 845 (1975).
71 Note, supra note 9, at 778. See also id. at 779-85 for a good discussion of nonlegal factors affecting a
prosecutor's decision not to prosecute.
72 435 F. Supp. at 357-58.
73 Note, supra note 9, at 789.
74 Most tort actions which have named coaches as defendants have involved claims of negligent instruc-
tion or supervision. See, e.g., McGee v. Board of Educ., 16 App. Div. 2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1962). This
Note will limit its consideration to the coach's role in sports violence and not deal with negligent in-
struction.
75 435 F. Supp. at 355.
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[T]he pre-game psychological preparation should be designed to generate an
emotion equivalent to that which would be experienced by a father whose
family had been endangered by another driver who had attempted to force the
family car off the side of a mountain road. The precise pitch of motivation for
the players at the beginning of the game should be the feeling of that father
when, after overtaking and stopping the offending vehicle, he is about to open
the door to take revenge upon the person of the other driver.7 6
This kind of intense preparation has an incredible effect on the performance of
players at any level, professional, collegiate or high school. Dean Payne, a
former linebacker at Northwestern, says, "Some coaches stress gang tackling.
You're taught to be there at the ball, and once you're there you're supposed to
pile on until the whistle blows. It can become a violent state of mind-you can
really get fired up and motivated to get someone." 7 7
Because of the great influence and the direct control they have over their
players, coaches may be held civilly or criminally responsible for the conduct
they encourage. Civil liability can be based on principles of agency; where a
principle intends the conduct or consequence of an agent's act, the principle is
subject to liability.7" Criminal responsibility might reach coaches through con-
spiracy statutes.
79
There is some evidence to support the inference that injuries in sports are the
result of instructions from coaches or employers who want opposing athletes
"taken out" of the contest. Such conspiracies do not require that serious in-
jury or bodily harm results before leaving the conspirator's subject to criminal
prosecution .... When fellow players and coaches overtly conspire to do in-
jury to the opposition, they conspire to commit crimes and should be subject
to prosecution.80
Any measure designed to control violent acts by players, whether imposed
internally or by society, will have little lasting effect unless it addresses itself to
the root of this evil-the "win at all costs" philosophy. Within this ethic,
violence is merely a strategic tool utilized to realize the ultimate goal of victory.
Equally culpable under the "win at all costs" doctrine are the owners
and/or management of professional teams and possibly the athletic associations
or school administrations of universities and high schools.
In general, owners can be held liable under the same theories as a coach;
civil liability being predicated on agency principles81 and criminal liability on
conpiracy statutes.8 2 In Averill v. Luttrell,83 the defendant Nashville Baseball
Club was exonerated of liability for the assault and battery committed by their
employee, Averill, who had struck and injured the plaintiff during a baseball
game. The court reasoned that the assault and battery by Averill,
76 Id.
77 Underwood, Punishment Is a Crime, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 21, 1978, at 32.
78 See Note, supra note 9, at 776.
79 Id.
80 Hechter, supra note 64, at 434-36.
81 See Note, supra note 9, at 776.
82 Id.
83 See 4 Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957).
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was no part of the ordinary risks expected to be encountered in sportsmanlike
play. Nor was there any proof showing that the assault was other than a willful
independant act on Averill's part, entirely outside the scope of his duties. The assault
was neither incident to nor in furtherance of his employer's business, and under the cir-
cumstances we think that the Nashville Baseball Club would not be liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.84
The key phrase in the exoneration of the defendant is "in furtherance of his
employer's business. " It is believed that, contrary to the Averill court's implica-
tion, violence is often a part of the employer's business.
A successful "business" in term contact sports has two characteristics:
high attendance figures and winning records. In most cases, the former condi-
tion is determined completely by the existence of the latter. Spectators have not
patronized losing teams, therefore, if owners are to succeed in the attendence
sweepstakes they must provide a winning team. Faced with the prospect of los-
ing records due to the absence of skilled players, owners have taken to "tactical
violence" as a means of achieving victory. This has been achieved, basically,
by employing players who specialize in the intimidation of the opposition by
the use or threat of physical violence, the so-called "enforcers." The in-
timidating presence of "enforcers" in hockey, basketball and football has car-
ried teams with comparatively little talent to championship seasons. Not sur-
prisingly, attendence flourishes and the business is deemed successful. In light
of the impact the "enforcers" have on the success of the business, their violent
acts should be viewed as being "in furtherance of their employer's business."
Certainly justice will not permit an employer to profit from the violent acts of
his employees and then allow him to escape liability when these acts cause in-
juries to other players. Indeed, the three million dollar jury award given in
Tomjanovich against the owners of the Lakers evinces a recognition of an
owner's responsibility for the tortious acts of his employee when the owner is
fully, aware of his violent tendencies.
Owners and other management personnel might also find themselves sub-
ject to criminal liability as part of the conspiracy involving the coach and the
players.
Under this theory liability can be imposed upon one who has declared his
allegiance to a particular common object [i.e., winning by resort to intentional
batteries outside the scope of the game], has implicitly resorted to the commis-
sion of foreseeable crimes in furtherance of this object, and has himself col-
laborated with his coach and players, giving support to the co-conspirators. 85
Once again it must be emphasized.that controls imposed upon players will
only be effective if they are successful in deterring owners and coaches as well.
As long as employment of violent tactics, and the coaches who teach them,
prove to be beneficial to owners, they will continue to use them regardless of
the restrictions placed on players. The root of sports violence goes much deeper
than the playing field and effective controls must recognize and deal with the
true sources of the problem.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
85 Hechter, supra note 64, at 435.
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Another alternative which an injured player has is to allege a negligence
action against an official. A valid claim against an official would probably re-
quire a showing of recklessness similar to other situations when negligence is
charged.
Few men and women would be willing to officiate athletic contests if their
mere negligence could result in their incurring personal liability for injuries
sustained by players. Courts have endeavored to avoid discouraging the free
participation in sports. 86 Similarly, a balance should be drawn so that officials
are held accountable for reckless conduct while not discouraging their par-
ticipation. The duty required of an official to avoid such tortious liability
should be the diligent enforcement of all safety rules. This does not mean that
an official would incur liability if he fails to call every violation that occurs on
the field. An official would be held liable only when he acts in willful or reckless
disregard of his duty to enforce that safety rules of the particular game.
In Carabba v. Anacortes School District No. 10387 the defendant referee was
found negligent in his supervision of a high school wrestling match. 88 During
the course of the wrestling match, the referee had turned from the action to
repair the wrestling mat. While the referee was distracted, the plaintiffs oppo-
nent applied an illegal "full nelson" which caused the severance of a major
portion of the spinal cord and rendered the plaintiff permanently paralyzed.
Carabba is important in that, first, it raises the possibility of imposing
liability on an official for failure to supervise properly an athletic contest.
Although negligent conduct was sufficient for holding the referee liable in
Carabba, recklessness would be the more appropriate standard.
Second, and more importantly, the court in Carabba found a master-
servant relationship between the school district and the referee. The court
found that under these circumstances the school district owed a duty to the stu-
dent participants.8 9 The court reasoned that
[O]ne may have a duty to see that due care is used in the protection of another,
a duty which is not satisfied by using care to delegate its performance to
another but is satisfied if, and only if, the person to whom the work of the pro-
tection is delegated is careful in giving the protection. [Here], the duty is non-
delegable. 90
The court concluded, therefore, that "if the referee was negligent, the school
district must, as a matter of law, respond in damages." 9 1 Applying this reason-
ing to violence in professional sports, if referee liability could be established, it
would appear that an injured player could maintain a claim for damages
against the NFL, NHL, or NBA under the master-servant theory espoused in
Carabba. The leagues, and the owners who constitute its hierarchies, have failed
repeatedly to deal with sports violence. Because the leagues and owners have
derived the greatest economic benefit from spectator attraction to sports
violence, requiring them to defend a tort action resulting from this violence
86 See 39 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
87 72 Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967).
88 Although wrestling is not a team contact sport, Carabba is useful in exhibiting the standard of care re-
quired of referees in sporting events.
89 See 72 Wash. 2d at 435 P.2d at 947.




might be a very fitting form of justice. The spectre of this liability would also
cause the leagues to deal more strictly with the problem of violence, so as to
avoid any damage to their image as a respected sporting activity.
IV. Reflections and Recommendations
Acts of violence have increased on the playing fields and in the arenas in
the United States and Canada. Unfortunately, howeirer, this problem is not
left on the playing field. In his book Sports in America James A. Michener wrote:
Within recent years the new frontier created by urban disruption has pro-
duced shocking levels of violence. I have just seen a report which states that in
American schools last year there were 204,000 instances in which students
beat up their teachers in the classroom, 9,000 cases of rape in washrooms, and
about 100 murders during school hours. Such conduct is incredible, and there
had better be a retreat from this dangerous addiction. One place to start would
be sports, both in the way they are played and in the behavior of the spec-
tators. Ice hockey and football have become too violent, and they set a
deplorable example for other sports.92
Sports violence does not occur in a vacuum. Large numbers of people
witness sports violence, either in person or via television, many of whom are
children. These impressionable young spectators have been shown to be tempt-
ed to imitate the action of their sports "heroes." According to a report done by
three physicians, there exists an "Evil Knievel syndrome" -imitation of ex-
hibitionism in sports. That study concluded that "televised violence, especially
during sporting events and news reporting, is increasingly implicated in im-
itative and aggressive behavior exhibited by children." ' 93 A separate study of
violence in Canadian amateur hockey included accusations that professional
hockey's use of violence as a "tactical instrument" outside of the rules con-
tributed greatly to the use of violence among amateurs. 94
Regardless of the medium by which sports violence is witnessed, the
overall danger to society is the same.
When moral rules are bent, more than sport is mangled. In the end, it is not
the players who are cheapened and injured, nor even the event itself. It is the
children and adults who watch and then repeat what they see on the
playground and in the stands-and perhaps in their lives.95
Action must be taken to abate sports violence. Theoretically, measures
taken by sports authorities and applied internally are preferred to societal con-
trols imposed through the legal system. Internal controls, however, have prov-
en inadequate. In football, for example, the primary sanction for a violation of
the rules is the loss of yardage, the amount being contingent upon the par-
ticular infraction. In particularly egregious situations, players are subject to ex-
92 J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 436 (1976).
93 Kanfer, Doing Violence in Sport, TIME, May 31, 1976, at 64.
94 Hechter, supra note 64, at 427.
95 Id.
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pulsion from the game and, in the case of paid professionals, to monetary
penalties imposed by the league commissioner. 6
Increasing violence suggests, however, that monetary penalties imposed
by the professional leagues have been ineffective in deterring violence on the
field. The amount of the fines in relation to the possible rewards of violence in-
dicates why monetary penalties have proven ineffective. NFL Commissioner
Pete Rozelle fined George Atkinson $1500 for his celebrated "cheap shot" of
Lynn Swann.9 7 Atkinson is a highly paid athlete whose intimidating style of
play contributes greatly to the success of his team. If Atkinson and his team-
mates are successful in their intimidation campaign, they will be rewarded with
play-off money, possibly as high as $25,000 per player. The financial disincen-
tives to violence are clearly inappropriate. In light of Atkinson's potential earn-
ings for being a "hit man," it is highly unlikely that a $1500 fine will deter
him, or others, from unrestrained violence.
Various theories have been proposed to explain the cavalier attitude with
which sports authorities have approached this problem. Some league officials
believe that the imposition of increased sanctions will alter the basic nature of
the game. Many of these officials also see a potential for disruption of league
solidarity when sanctions are imposed on one player or teams and not on
another. Another theory views professional leagues as profit-seeking entities,
cognizant only of the fact that violence "sells tickets" and oblivious to the
hazards which accompany such a philosophy. The simplest explanation is that
sports authorities merely do not believe they have a problem.
Whatever the reason or attempted justification for the lack of effective in-
ternal control, the conclusion is clear-society must intervene and enforce a
level of conduct which is reasonable.
There are no brass bands or waving pennants in the courtrooms and emergen-
cy wards. With a gangland mentality allowed on the field and with a sport
whose leadership is more responsive to Nielson ratings than injury reports, it
is small wonder that the wolves (mostly lawyers) are at football's door.
"Litigation is waking people up" says [Dr. Kenneth] Clarke, [founder of the
National Athletic Injury/Illness Reporting System]. "Litigation will be the
cause of change." When owners are convinced that injuries are costing them
money they will push for reform.98
It is imperative that action be taken now to abate sports violence. Failure
to take prompt action may result in a generation of "Little enforcers," youths
who imitate and grow to accept the violent ways of their "heroes."
Operationally, internal and societal controls should be toughest on
coaches and owners.
Coaches are not monsters. As a group they are probably more honorable and
caring than most. The great majority think of their calling as a high one, en-
trusted as they are with the development of young men. But coaches at almost
every level, from high school up, are under great pressure to win.9 9 The em-
96 435 F. Supp. at 354.
97 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
98 Underwood, Speed Is All the Rage, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1978, at 38.
99 Underwood, Football's Unfolding Tragedy, READER'S DIGEST, Sept. 1979, at 96.
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phasis on winning has given rise to a "win at all costs" philosophy which
creates an atmosphere where undue violence is more likely to occur. 100
In response to the need to "win at all costs,"some coaches will allow
players to "get away with what they can" in terms of conduct proscribed by
the rules. From the philosophy of "get away with what you can," malicious
and unrestrained violence is soon to follow, deviations which pervert sport. 1' 1
What should be the response to coaches who instruct their players to violate the
rules? If coaches do not teach good sportsmanship, they must be responsible for
the acts of bad sportsmen. 102 Civil and criminal liability exist as possible deter-
rents to the coach who would encourage violent play in an effort to gain a tac-
tical advantage. Ideally the preferable response to this type of coaching
philosophy would be meaningful fines, seasonal expulsion or banishment from
the game entirely. The sports establishment must be made to realize that
drastic steps may be necessary.
Owners, like coaches, should be provided with effective deterrents. Many
in sports management believe that violence is necessary to the game. They not
only condone it but encourage it, because violence creates fan interest and,
therefore, sells tickets. 103 It is the management who solicits, hires, and tolerates
coaches who teach violent tactics. Therefore, they may be the most culpable of
all. Evidently the jury that awarded Rudy Tomjanovich $1,500,000 in punitive
damages against California Sports, Inc. found this to be the case.
Owners and managements who tolerate violence being promoted by
coaches or performed by players within their employ, must be held account-
able. The possibility of civil and criminal liability should serve as some deter-
rence. Internally, heavy fines, season expulsion and banishments are viable
measures. The severity should be increased, however, so as to be commen-
surate with the heightened culpability of the owners.
In an effort to curb violence once the players reach the field, game officials
should enforce the rules more strictly. Despite the need for having a "tight
game" called in the NFL, the opposite has been the case. According to one
NFL coach, "As you progress up the ladder from high school to pro, you see
officials grow more liberal in their interpretation of the rules, and that is a
dangerous thing."10 4 Actually, because the potential for violence seems to in-
crease with the level of competition, commonsense suggests that the rules be
enforced more stringently in professional sport than at lower levels.
Imposing civil liability on referees would be an effective sanction if the
league itself were found liable under a master-servant relationship. Internally,
league officials should encourage referees to enforce the rules more strictly. Ad-
ditionally, the various leagues should impose more stringent age and physical
condition requirements on game officials. Effective supervision by referees
must be a component of any plan to combat sports violence. In setting forth
referee "fitness" requirements, cognizance must be taken of the player/official
100 Woolf, supra note 57.
101 Underwood, supra note 77, at 35.
102 Id. at 53.
103 See Woolf, supra note 57.
104 Underwood, supra note 77, at 40.
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ratio and age and physical ability disparities between player and officials.
Referees are trying to control contests in which the player to official ratio
ranges from four to one in football to six to one in hockey. Each of these players
are in better physical condition and possess athletic abilities which greatly ex-
ceed that of the official. If the league, therefore, has any hope of controlling this
fast-paced action and the violence which it has bred, the officials must be in
"top shape."
To some extent, the players who commit acts of sports violence are the
real victims; victims of a system which they really don't understand. For most
players violence in competition become personally acceptable at a very young
age. These youths were products of a system that rarely allowed them an op-
portunity to question the ethics of their actions on a playing field. In the ma-
jority of cases, unfortunately, the only enduring ethic was embodied in the final
score. Years later, after his actions have seriously injured someone it is hardly
surprising that a player claims his conduct was "part of the game." In the
abstract his conduct certainly is unacceptable. As a practical matter, however,
players rarely invent violent techniques and are merely playing the game the
way society has allowed it to be taught to them.
Nonetheless, as members of society, however, players must become more
responsible for their behavior. Failing this responsibility, the internal and
societal controls previously mentioned for coaches and owners would be equal-
ly applicable to players. 10 5
It is possible that the high level of violence in sports today properly reflects
society. Michener said that American sports are especially violent because they
are forced to reflect the inherent violence of our society.' 0 6 The question is
raised, does violence in society cause violence in sports or vice versa? If
violence in sports precipitates violence in society, steps must be taken by the
community to cure this ill and bring its conduct within an acceptable norm.
Conversely, if violence in society gives rise to violence in sports, efforts must be
aimed at diminishing violence on an individual and societal level. Under the
latter theory, sports would serve as a barometer for measuring the effectiveness
of efforts designed to curb violence in the society at large.
Under either theory, it is clear that as individual members of society we
must dismiss the hypocritical approach sometimes taken in regard to violence
in the community at large. Tolerating violence in the home while condemning
105 One area of player conduct warrants note. League and team officials, as well as players, must move
to eliminate the use of amphetamines by players as a means of "getting up" for a game. According to Dr.
Arnold Mandrell, author of The Nightmare Season, a book recounting his experiences as team psychiatrist for
the NFL San Diego Chargers, amphetamines are:
the single factor that causes unnecessary violence in pro football today .... The normal "diet"
pill or capsule-Benzedrine, Dexedrine, Eskatrol-contains 5 to 15 milligrams of amphetamine.
The prolonged, excited "high" from one pill is familiar not only to fat people but also to long-
haul truckers and students cramming for examinations. Imagine what it is like to gulp down 30
pills at one time. The result is a prepsychotic paranoid rage state. A five-hour temper tantrum
that produces the late hits, the fights, the unconscionable assaults on quarterbacks that are ruin-
ing pro football.
Underwood, supra note 98, at 32.
In the NFL the "win at all costs" intensity, the amphetamines and the high physical properties of the game
all combine to produce a type of "war ethic." See Underwood, supra note 76, at 36. It is time that we make a
move to replace this ethic with one that better reflects the needs and expectations of society.
106 J. MICHENER, supra note 92, at 436.
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its occurrence in a football game will not, in the long run, cure any societal ills.
Action must be taken presently to root violent behavior out of all aspects of
society. Only then can we hope to have restored complete dignity to our sports
programs and to our society as well.
Cameron Jay Rains
